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Abstract
This paper presents logics for reasoning about extension and reduction of partial information states This
enterprise amounts to nonpersistent variations of certain constructive logics in particular the socalled logic
of constructible falsity of Nelson 	 We provide simple semantics sequential calculi completeness and
decidability proofs
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The most simple logical means for knowledge representation is the semantic concept of
partial truthassignment Propositions with a denite truthvalue reect the knowledge of a
chosen agent Propositions which are mapped to  are the things that the agents knows to be
true while propositions which have value  cover the information that the agents knows to be
false Propositions whose truthvalues are left underspecied denote the agent	s ignorance
In this paper we develop dynamic extensions over these simple static representations that
is formalisms which provide logical means for reasoning about changing partial information
states We will followVan Benthem and De Rijke	s style of dynamic modal logic 
van Benthem
 
de Rijke  where such formalisms are dened on the basis of total information
states We will focus on two kinds of changes enrichment and reduction These kinds of ma
nipulations of states can easily be dened using a structural extension order   which evolves
naturally from the denition of partiality Given the static meaning 

  of a proposition   
ie the partial states which support this proposition the dynamic meaning 

 
dy
is induced
by the extension order
fhs ti j s   t  t  

 g
It represents a relational description of what happens to a state s when it is extended with
the information   In an analogous way we specify the negative dynamic meaning 

 
 
dy
of  
that is the ways a situation s can shrink when the information   has been removed from it
fhs ti j t   s  t  

 g
These two dynamic denotations are the basic relations for dynamic modal reasoning over
 extension and reduction
 
Such explicit dynamics will be accommodated by operators 
 
u
and 
 
d
for making universal statements over extensions and reductions respectively Their
dual existential counterparts will be called h i
u
and h i
d
 A proposition of the form 
 
u

says that extending the current state with the information that   necessarily leads to a state
which supports  while h i
d
 means that it is possible to retract   from the current state
in such a way that  holds afterwards
Dynamic constructive and nonmonotonic logic
The abovementioned simple dynamic setting originates from Kripke	s semantic analysis of
intuitionistic logic 
Kripke  Intuitionistic logic can be seen as a dynamic logic of pos
sessing mathematical proofs and because this kind of information is taken to be persistent
that is proofs cannot be forgotten or retracted only the extension relation is used for inter
preting intensional connectives like implication and negation In a dynamic modal setting
intuitionistic implication    can be described as 
 
u
 while intuitionistic negation of  
boils down to 
 
u
 where  is the absurd or unprovable proposition
The latter interpretation of negative information has led to discussion among construc
tivists and also inspired dierent constructivistic axiomatizations of mathematical reason
ing One of these alternatives has been proposed in 
Nelson 

His logic of constructible
falsity treats negative information in the same fashion as positive information by taking refu
tation as a second mathematical construction Proofs determine constructible truth while
refutations register constructible falsity This logic reinstalls classical laws like the double
negation and de Morgan equivalences in constructive logic

Nelson	s logic is of particular
importance here because it completely describes the persistent upward	 part of the logics of
this paper Technically speaking the logics we consider naturally arise from extending the
expressivity of Nelson	s logic over its Kripke semantics which is principally the dynamics
over partial states which has been described above

In 
Gabbay  a nonpersistent extension of intuitionistic logic has been introduced by
means of adding existential expressivity over the extension relation The reason is to capture
the consistencyoperatorM of the original default logic of 
Reiter  in an explicit fashion
The statement M  means that the current state can be extended with the information   It
can be dened in the dynamic modal setting by hi
u
  where  is the trivial proposition
which is always true proved In 
Turner  this idea has been incorporated in the setting
of partial logic The kind of Kripke models for Nelson	s logic and the upanddown logics of
this paper are also used there
These nonpersistent variations can be seen as subsystems of the upward	 parts of the up
anddown logics of this paper We will stick to classical denitions of semantic consequence
 
These extension and reduction relations are only a small fragment of the relational wealth which has
been employed in van Benthem  He uses further relational constructions to interpret more complex
dynamic operations which facilitates denition of minimal variations of the extension and reduction relations
A negative side e	ect of the richness of Van Benthem
s system is its undecidability de Rijke  de Rijke


A thorough essay on di	erent treatments of negative information in constructive logic is Wansing 

Of course without accepting the constructively condemned principle of the excluded middle

Kripke semantics for Nelson
s logic can be found in Thomason  Nelson
s logic has also been prop
agated outside the eld of mathematical logic A paper which demonstrates its use in default logic and logic
programming is Pearce 
 Partial Logic 
and validity and subsequently our systems will behave perfectly monotonic transitive com
mutative etcetera More unorthodox nonmonotonic entailment relations can be dened
within the language of our upanddown logics For example an obvious nonmonotonic can
didate is the following  follows from the assumption sequence  
 
      
n
if extending an
arbitrary state consecutively with  
 
through  
n
always leads to a state which veries  In
other words 
 
 

u
   
 
n

u
 holds always Nonmonotonicity immediately pops up because
hi
u
  follows from itself while it does not follow from the extended sequence hi
u
  
 
u


In section  we give a brief presentation of the semantics of partial logic and correspond
ing sequential axiomatizations In  we follow the same procedure for their dynamic modal
extensions Finally in section  we prove completeness and decidability for the sequential
systems of the rst two sections
  Partial Logic
In this rst section we shortly present a simple setting of partial propositional logics As
partial logics are most often inspired by semantic motivations we wish to start with some of
their basic modeltheoretic concepts
 Partial valuations
Definition  A partial valuation V is a partial function which assigns truthvalues to a
given set of propositional variables IP  In order to distinguish partial functions from total
functions we replace the normal functional arrow  by   In short V  IP   f g The
collection of all partial valuations is denoted by P

The domain of V  P DomV  is the
set of all propositional variables which obtain a truthvalue by V 
DomV   fp  IP j V p   or V p  g
If DomV   IP then V is said to be total V

is said to be an extension of V whenever V

and V agree on all the propositional variables in the domain of V  We write V v V

if this
relation holds
V v V

def
	 
p  DomV   V p  V

p
This last relation is of particular interest V v V

says that V

contains at least as much
information as V  Given this information order we are able to develop the kind of dynamics
which has been mentioned in the introduction
 Languages with static denotation
There are many dierent partial logics Loss of twovaluedness creates a lot of freedom and
subsequently leads to dispute and confusion Even the basic choices of the interpretation of

Commutativity also fails in an obvious way   follows from  
u
  hi
u
  while it does not follow
necessarily from hi
u
   
u
 

Partial valuations forbid the possibility for a proposition to be true and false at the same time A
technical removal of this excluded fourth value
 boils down to redening partial valuations V as relations
between propositional variables IP and truthvalues V  IP  f g Such liberalism has been defended
for epistemic purposes in Belnap  In Jaspars a the reader nds some arguments against this
position A technical advantage of going fourvalued is that the classical symmetry between negative and
positive information in partial logic gets restored See eg Wagner 
 Partial Logic 
ordinary static connectives have led to divergent opinions  Many conicting choices however
are due merely to the underlying motivations of dierent applications of partial logic This
exibility has led to many dierent partial logics
The basic static language L which we will use is dened below The reason why we have
chosen L as our basic static partial equipment will be motivated on semantical grounds later
on in this subsection
Definition  Let IP be a nonempty enumerable set of propositional variables or atoms
The language L is the smallest superset of IP such that
    L 	       L and   L
These connectives are called negation conjunction and falsum respectively
We will avoid superuous use of parentheses and take binary connectives to dominate over
unary connectives For example   means   and not   Furthermore
we will also use convenient abbreviations like    verum         
disjunction The letters p q r possibly with additional sub or superscripts are used as
atoms Greek lower case letters are used to denote arbitrary formulae while Greek capitals
denote sets of formulae Throughout the text we will also use sets of formulae in the scope
of connectives and operators Such expressions should be read in the most straightforward
distributive manner For example   f  j    g and      f    j   g
For a given V  P the members of L obtain truthvalues according the following inductive
scheme
Table 
V j  p V p    p  IP  V  j p V p    p  IP 
V j   V  j 
V j   V  j  V  j  V j  
V j      V j    V j   V  j     V  j  or V  j 
Clearly there are other interpretations of negation and conjunction which are feasible as
well The choices which have been made in Table  are called strong or exclusive negation for 
and strong Kleene for  The weak Kleene conjunction M gives the same results whenever both
conjuncts have a determined truthvalue and is undened whenever one of the conjuncts is
undened This entails the same truth conditions but strengthens the falsity of conjunctions
This weak Kleene conjunction can be dened in terms of L
 M             
The language L has no complete expressive power over partial valuations This means
that there are other truthvalue functional connectives which cannot be expressed in terms
of L in the way the weak Kleene conjunction above has been dened A simple example is
weak negation  which expresses that its argument is not true Even when this connective is
added to the language some expressive power is still lacking Complete expressivity is reached
 Partial Logic 
when the ary connective  has been added as well which is the proposition which is always
undened The following table adds the truthvalues for these additional connectives

Table 
V j   V j   V  j  V j  
V j   V  j 
The connectives in Table  have been distinguished from those in Table  on purpose Their
separation embodies the dierence between partial and threevalued logics In our view three
valued logics are logics with three equally qualied truthvalues while partial logic treats
undenedness as pure nontruthvaluedness This distinction of determinate truthvalues and
undenedness entails two crucial constraints for real	 partial logics First whenever all the
parts of some proposition have obtained a truthvalue then the proposition ought to get a
truthvalue as well and second if a proposition contains undened parts then it may only
get a truthvalue whenever at least one part has a truthvalue Adherence to these dogmas of
partiality leads to abandonment of connectives like  by the latter constraint and  by the
former requirement

We will not commit ourselves strictly to these principles of partiality
but instead keep nonpartial	 connectives separated
Definition  The static Pdenotation 

 
P
of a proposition    L is given by the set of
partial valuations which support   ie fV  P j V j  g We say that a set of formulae
  L is a Pvalid consequence of    whenever all V  P which verify all members of 
verify at least one of the formulae in 
	
We write
 j
P

def
	
 






 
P



 






P



When an argument in the consequence relation is left blank then this argument is taken to
be the empty set
Below we will use analogous denitions for other classes of models and languages A simple
replacement of P and L is enough to get the right denitions on the right place

A proof of this full expressivity of L
  
can be found in Langholm  In van Benthem 
the reader nds a functional completeness proof for L
 
with respect to the class of closed and persistence
preserving connectives Closedness refers to truthvalue determination for the connected proposition whenever
its connected parts have all determined truthvalues Persistence preservation of a connective means that
persistence of its parts is preserved A functional completeness proof for L
 
with respect to persistence
preservation is due to Blamey  In Thijsse  the reader nds an extensive survey on denability in
partial logic with additional results for other languages

Technically these two claims boil down to closed persistence preservation By Van Benthem
s functional
completeness result for L van Benthem  the partiality constraints precisely gives us our linguistic means
for partial propositional logic
	
There is some freedom here The socalled double barreled consequence denition has also been used eg
Muskens  This refers to a stricter notion of validity all models of  verify at least one of  and all
models which falsify all formulae in  falsify at least one element of  This notion of validity is propagated
mainly because it structurally behaves better than our singlebarreled denition The underlying reason is
that it restores contraposition In Thijsse  the reader nds a classication of di	erent sorts of denitions
of valid consequence for partial logics
 Partial Logic 
Observation  Signicant classical validities which are Pinvalid are contraposition and
the principle of the excluded middle
 j
P
 	  j
P
  j
P
 	  j
P

j
P
   
The contraposition of the excluded middle the ex falso principle is aPvalidity     j
P

 
which also immediately is a counterexample for contraposition Many other classical prin
ciples are inherited by partial logic eg de Morgan principles double negation and the
distribution principle for conjunction and disjunction
 Sequential axiomatizations of partial logics
In this section we give a short presentation of a Gentzenstyle sequential axiomatization of P
validity There are two main reasons to choose this style of deduction First of all sequential
systems turn out to be very practical when it comes to metatheory of partial logics and
secondly they show the logical dierence with classical systems very clearly
Definition  In general we dene our sequential format as follows

 
 
 
   
n
 
n

n 
 
n 


i
and 
i
are sets of formulae for all i  f     ng The symbol  denotes the derivation
relation between these sets of formulae    is called a sequent  is the assumption set
of this sequent and  its conclusion set The fraction notation in  must be interpreted
as a conditional The sequents 
i
 
i
with i   n are the conditions of the rule in  and

n 
 
n 
is the consequence of this rule If n   then the set of conditions is empty In
this case the rule is said to be axiomatic Because the arguments of the derivation relation
are sets the notations    and 

refer to   f g and   

 respectively Again empty
arguments of sequents refer to the empty set
A sequential system S is a set of such sequential rules If L
S
is the underlying language and
  L
S
 then we say that  
S
 is an Ssequent or  is Sderivable from  whenever
   can be established after a nite number of applications of the rules in S
The arguments of sequents have been chosen to be sets on purpose It reduces the amount
of structural rules The following table presents the structural rules which are left
Table 
Structural rules
 	  if  
    start
 	    
 

 
	 
lmon
 	    
 
 	 
 
rmon
 	  
 
  	 
 

 
	 
 
cut
 

Take    p Clearly p
P
 p
P
  while p
P
 p
P
  P The valuation with empty domain is
not a member of the last set
 Partial Logic 
The left and righthand introduction of connectives are dened in two manners It may be
introduced straight away the trueintroductions and under the scope of a single negation
the falserules This entails four possible introduction rules for every connective The table
below presents the true and falserules separately
  
Table 
True
 	  ltrue 
 	 
 	 
ltrue 
   	 
    	 
ltrue 
 	  
 
	 
 

 
	  
 
rtrue 
False
 	  rfalse 
  	 
 	 
lfalse 
 	 
 	 
rfalse 
 	  
 
 	 
 

 
  	 
 
lfalse 
 	 
 	   
rfalse 
The set of rules in Tables  and  is the system P The only dierence with classical
propositional logic is the absence of
    
   
rtrue 
This rule in combination with ltrue  establishes contraposition for classical propositional
logic This also means that all falserules are superuous in classical logic They are merely
meant as local repairs of the absence of contraposition in partial logics
Observation  If  
P
 then there exists nite 



 L such that 


P


 This
can be proved easily by an induction on the length of Pderivations and the nite nature of
Pderivability All considered systems in this paper share this niteness property We will
make use of it without explicit reference
The following table presents rules for axiomatization of Pvalidity over the corresponding
Lextensions
  
Fenstad Langholm  Vespren  propose a slightly more elegant way of dealing with these four
di	erent places of introduction They introduce quadrants which are fourplaced variants of sequents There
are two additional stacks for explicitly false formulae This presents a structurally elegant fashion of deduction
Because its style is somewhat unusual and the notation unpractical we kept to an ordinary sequential style
	 Dynamic extensions of partial logic 
Table 
Rules for  and 
 	  ltrue 
 	  lfalse 
 	 
  	 
ltrue 
  	 
 	 
rtrue 
  	 
   	 
lfalse 
 	 
 	   
rfalse 
The systems which contain the rules andor the rules for the languages L
 
 L

and
L
 
are called P
 
 P

and P
 
 respectively The same policy will be maintained for the
system ud in the next section
Theorem  The system P is sound and complete for Pvalidity over the language L For
all   L  
P
 	  j
P
 The same results hold for the extended static derivation
systems with weak negation andor 
Soundness results are omitted here They can all be proved by a straightforward induction
on the length of derivations The completeness results are postponed to section  where
appropriate metatheoretical equipment will be introduced
 Dynamic extensions of partial logic
The extension relation over partial valuations has been given in Denition  If V v V

then
V

assigns the same truthvalues as V does to all the atoms which appear in the domain of V 
but it may have a larger domain than V  Interpreting partial valuations as information states
the extension relation says that V

contains at least as much hard	 or factual information as
V 
 Information models
In this section we will develop dynamic modal logics over the extension relation v For
this purpose we extend the basic languages of the previous section with up and down
operators 
 
u
 h i
u
 
 
d
 h i
d
 If L

is some language for partial logic which is closed under
the connectives that it employs then L

ud
will be used to denote the indicated dynamic
extension ie the smallest superset of L

which is closed under the L

connectives and the
abovementioned dynamic operators
The interpretation of the up and downoperators is analogous to the standard necessity
and possibility operators in ordinary modal logic over the relations 

 
dy
and 

 
 
dy
which we
have briey introduced in the preamble of this paper Possible world models which establish
a complete interpretation of this modal framework are socalled information models
Definition  An information model is a triple M  hW  V i such that W is a non
empty set of worlds or information states   is a preorder over W  which is called the
information relation of M  and V is a monotonic global valuation function ie V W  P
is such that for all w v  W if w   v then also V w v V v The class of all information
models is denoted by N
	 Dynamic extensions of partial logic 
The updown extension L
ud
of L obtains an obvious truthconditional semantics by com
bining the static semantics of L with an interpretation of the up and downoperators over
the information relation
Table  Let M  hW  V i  N and w  W 
Mw j  p V wp    Mw  j p V wp   
The Lconnectives obtain truthvalues according to the decomposition as in Table  The
additional connectives for the static extensions in the preceding section follow the same
decomposition as in Table 
Mw j  	

u
  v  w M v j  M v j  
Mw  j 	

u
  v  w M v j    M v  j 
Mw j  	

d
  v  w M v j  M v j  
Mw  j 	

d
  v  w M v j    M v  j 
Figure 
1
2
3
5
p,q
p,q,−r
M
p,−r
4
Here is a simple information model M  The proposition letters are the atoms which are
locally veried The minus symbol refers to local falsication
Definition  The following sets stipulate dierent interpretation sets for a given proposi
tion  
		


N
  fhMwi j Mw j  g
		


M
N
  fw in M j Mw j  g
		


hMwi
N
  fu in M j w  u  Mu j  g
		


hMwi
N
  fu in M j u  w  Mu j  g
The rst set represents the global static meaning of   while the second represents the local
 with respect to M  N  static meaning of   The two last sets denote contextsensitive
interpretations of   The rst of them is the contextual  with respect to the information
	 Dynamic extensions of partial logic 	

state w in M  meaning of   that is the extensions of w which verify   The second set
is the negative contextual meaning of   with respect to w in M  These contextual interpre
tations entail the local dynamic relational interpretations by abstracting over the contextual
information states


 
M 
Ndy
 fhw ui j u  

 
hMwi 
N
g
We dene h i
u
and h i
d
by means of the strong negation 
 
u
 and 
 
d
 respectively
This yields an ordinary polymodal format over the local dynamic relations above
Every state of information has its factual static information specied by means of a local
partial valuation and the information relation species a structural extension relation be
tween the states This information relation is a subrelation of the extension relation over the
local partial valuations and not identical to it Information states also contain information in
the way they can be extended Additional dynamic information constrains the set of possible
local partial valuations as extensions The example model in Figure  illustrates clearly the
contextsensitivity of dynamic interpretation For example M  j 
p
u
q whileM  j 
p
u
q
still their local valuations are the same empty Speaking in dynamic terms p has the same
meaning as q in  This is certainly not the case in context 
An important aspect of formulae is their preservation behavior with respect to the infor
mation order Formulae that are persistent are the ones which are maintained in upward
direction of the information relation Antipersistent information is information which will
never be lost when going downwards Examples of persistent formulae are provided by the
complete static language L and formulae of the form 
 
u
 and h i
d
 Examples of anti
persistent formulae are formulae of the form 
 
d
 and h i
u

Definition  A formula   is persistent if for all M  N with information relation   and
w v in M  Mw j    w   v 	 M v j   A formula   is antipersistent if for all
M  N with information relation   and w v in M  Mw j    v   w 	 M v j  
 Application of information models
Information models have been employed in dierent elds of pure and applied logic With
respect to the former category these models closely resemble the kind of Kripke structures
which are used as models for Heyting	s intuitionistic logic 
Kripke 
 
They dier from
the information models of the previous subsection only in the global valuation function In
this case the valuation function is taken to be a map from the states to subsets of atoms which
is monotonic over the information order Falsity does not have an intuitionistic status Nelson

Nelson  extended intuitionistic logic with a constructive notion of falsity Information
models provide a precise semantics for this logic of constructible falsity 
Gurevich  In
fact this logic is a subsystem of the up and down formalism of the previous section The
language consists of L with an additional implication The truth of    coincides with

 
u
  as in intuitionistic logic while its falsity has an extensional denotation    
In the eld of nonmonotonic logic information models have been used in 
Turner 
Turner denes an ordinary  modal logic over the information relation on the basis of an
 
A good survey on Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is Fitting 
	 Dynamic extensions of partial logic 		
extension of L with these standard modal operators   is the same as 

u
  and   is
dually dened  
A slight variation of information models has been employed by 
Veltman  as so
called datasemantics for modeltheoretic analysis of natural language conditionals The
models which are used there are the same as the information models above with an additional
renability constraint This constraint says that every information state can be extended with
the truth of a proposition   or its falsity For a model M  hW  V i

s  W 
  t  W  s   t and M t j   or M t j  
Veltman	s conditionals     obtain the same meaning of 
 
u
  both for truth and falsity
 Axiomatizations for partial up and down logics
The following Tables  and  present a sequential axiomatization of the partial up and down
logics which have been dened in the previous subsection The system which is obtained by
putting P and the rules of the two next tables together is called ud To begin with we need
to register many socalled persistence rules and some variations
Table 
Persistence rules
 	 p p  IP
 	 	

u
p
pers IP
 	 p p  IP
 	 	

u
p
pers IP
 	 	

u

 	 	

u
	

u

pers up
 	 hi
d

 	 	

u
hi
d

pers down
 hi
u
 	 
 hi
u
hi
u
 	 
cpers up
 	

d
 	 
 hi
u
	

d
 	 
cpers down
 	 hi
u

 	 	

d
hi
u

apers up
 	 	

d

 	 	

d
	

d

apers down
 	

u
 	 
 hi
d
	

u
 	 
capers up
 hi
d
 	 
 hi
d
hi
d
 	 
capers down
The rst two rules record the persistence of literals This means that literals are preserved
when we extend information states This captures the monotonicity of the global valuation
functions over information models The second pair of rules takes care of persistence for for
mulae of the form 
 
u
 and h i
d
 The third pair of rules are contrapositional formulations
of these persistence rules They need to be installed because ud lacks contraposition just
like P The two last pairs arrange the antipersistence for formulae of the form h i
u
 and

 
d
 in the same manner
The following table presents the introduction rules for the dynamic modal operators
	 Dynamic extensions of partial logic 	 
Table 	
Up and down rules
 	  
 
  	 
 

 
 	

u
 	 
 
ltrue up
  	 
	

u
 	 	

u
	

u

rtrue up
  	 
	

u
	

u
 	 	

u

lfalse up
 	  
 
	 
 

 
	 	

u

 
rfalse up
  	  
 
  	 
 

 
 	

d
 	 
 
ltrue down
 	  
	

d
 	 	

d
	

d

rtrue down
 	 
	

d
	

d
 	 	

d

lfalse down
  	  
 
	 
 

 
	 	

d

 
rfalse down
These rules look pretty entangled but removing the  and 	s make them look far more
familiar If we take      in the rst pair true up modus ponens and a weak version
of the deduction rule implication introduction appear Removing the  and 	s from the
other rules give dierent permutational completions of these wellknown rules
Example 
Modi Ponentes Deduction rules
	

u
  	
ud
 	

d
 	
ud
 
  	
ud
hi
u
  	
ud
hi
d
 
 	
ud
 	
ud
	

u
 	
ud
  	
ud
	

d

  	
ud
 hi
u
 	
ud
 	
ud
 hi
d
 	
ud
The deduction rules are only valid with an empty assumption set In general we do not
have    
ud
 	  
ud

 
u
 This only holds when all members of  are all persistent
in a deductive way ie in terms of ud If  is also udantipersistent we even have
   
ud
	  
ud

 
u

Definition 	 Let   L
ud
 The udpersistent part p
ud
 of  is the set f    j   
ud


u
 g the udantipersistent part ap
ud
of  is f    j   
ud


d
 g In other words for
udpersistent formulae we can derive by means of the udrules that they are preserved in
upward direction For udantipersistent we can derive that they are preserve downwards
Example 
Strengthened deduction rules
For all   p
ud
L
ud
  ap
ud
L
ud

  	
ud
  	
ud
	

u
    	
ud
  hi
u
 	
ud

 	
ud
   	
ud
	

d
   	
ud
  hi
d
 	
ud

Note that  and  have mutually exchanged their sequential position in the last two rules
For getting a complete deduction rule for the downoperators an antipersistent assumption
set and a persistent conclusion set is required Some other important classes of udsequents
are given in the following example

 Completeness and Decidability 	
Example 
simplification of hi
u
and 	

d
duality principles
hi
u
 
ud
hi
u
 
ud
hi
u
  
	

d
 
ud
	

d
 
ud
	

d
  
hi
u
	

d
 	
ud
  	
ud
	

u
hi
d

hi
d
	

u
 	
ud
  	
ud
	

d
hi
u

modality reductions
	

u
	

u
 
ud
hi
d
	

u
 
ud
	

u

	

d
hi
u
 
ud
hi
u
hi
u
 
ud
hi
u

	

d
	

d
 
ud
hi
u
	

d
 
ud
	

d

	

u
hi
d
 
ud
hi
d
hi
d
 
ud
hi
d

The duality principles illustrate the converse interpretation of the up and downoperators
which are known from temporal logic The modality reductions rephrase the persistence and
antipersistence briey
Theorem  The system ud is sound and complete for Nvalidity over the language L
ud

for all   L
ud
  
ud
 	  j
N
 These results also hold for the extended up and
down systems ud
 
 ud

and ud
 

Proof Soundness of the udsystem is omitted The completeness is postponed to the
next section 
 Completeness and Decidability
In this section the completeness proof for ud is presented We follow the Henkin procedure on
the basis of socalled saturated sets This concept is a generalization of maximally consistent
sets
 
which are used for this purpose in standard modal logic 
Hughes  Cresswell  A
decidability proof of ud can be obtained by means of a fairly simple ltration technique
 Saturated sets
Definition 
 Let S be a certain sequential derivation system and let L
S
be its language
S is consistent i  
S
 A set of formulae   L
S
is said to be Sconsistent whenever
 
S
 A set of formulae   L
S
is said to be Ssaturated whenever for all   L
S

 
S
	     
The collection of all Ssaturated sets will be denoted by Sat
S
in the sequel of the text
!  L
S
is an Ssaturator of a set   L
S
whenever for all   L
S

 
S
	   !  
We will call  an Ssaturant of ! We abbreviate this relation between  and ! by  E
S
!
 
A maximally consistent set is a consistent set which cannot be extended without losing its consistency

 Completeness and Decidability 	
The following proposition shows that if negation may be shifted according to l and rtrue
 saturation and maximal consistency most often coincide
Proposition  For every system S which contains the start the lmon rule and the
l and rtrue  all Ssaturated sets are maximally Sconsistent
Proof Let S be a system which contains the abovementioned rules Both    
S

and 
S
    Let   Sat
S
with     which says that there exists    L
S
such
that      and      Because   Sat
S
  and  we have     and so
    This conclusion in combination with  and  yields  
S
 which contradicts
  Sat
S
 
This proposition proves that for classical propositional logic the two notions are equal In
partial logic they are obviously dierent Maximal consistency implies saturation but not
the other way around
The notion of saturated sets has been introduced in the eld of intuitionistic logic 
Aczel
 
Thomason 
 
In these papers saturated sets are dened by three independent
properties which we obtain by substitution of   and  for the cardinality of  in the
denition of saturation above Such denitions work perfectly when the underlying language
contains a disjunction which captures the multiplicity of the righthand arguments of the
sequents
Observation  Let S be a sequential derivation system with language L
S
which contains
a disjunction  such that for all   L
S
and     L
S
  
S
  	  
S
   
A set of formulae is Ssaturated i
  
   	    
      	     or   
The rst two properties immediately follow from the denition of saturation The rst has
been dened as consistency Sets which obey the second property are called theories The
last properties is often called saturation but we have chosen this name for the sequential
denition which captures all the three properties and which also applies to longer conclusion
arguments of sequents This is very useful when we deal with a disjunctionfree language
The denition of a saturator is particularly important for proving completeness for partial
intensional logics like ud We will prove that for every system which contains the structural
rules of P the relation  E
S
! is the same as the existence of an Ssaturated set between
 and ! The relevance of this result is that saturators entail an upper bound for searching
saturated sets which is often required in proving completeness in the Henkin tradition for
partial intensional logics Usually one looks for states	 which contain certain information
but which may not be too specied Many completeness results for partial modal logics can
easily be obtained by proving saturation relations of this kind 
Jaspars 
 
Intuitionistic logic only has a restricted version of rtrue  It may be applied only with an empty
conclusion set    	  
  	   This restricted version keeps saturation and maximal consistency apart
as well

 Completeness and Decidability 	
Lemma  Let S be a sequential derivation system which contains the cut rule If  E
S
!
and  
S
 for a nite set   L
S
 then there exists    such that   fg E
S
!
Proof Let  E
S
! and  
S
 with  nite and suppose that fg E
S
! for all   
This means that for all    there exists "

 L
S
such that
  
S
"

and "

 !  
Let " 
S

"

 rmon yields   
S
" for all    Applying cut to this last Ssequent
and the assumption  
S
 yields  
S
  " Repetition of cutapplication for all 	s
completely eliminates  from the last Ssequent In short  
S
" Because  E
S
! we
conclude "  !   This contradicts that "

 !   for all    
This lemma shows that saturants can be extended in such a way that they remain saturants
of the same saturator In fact a saturant can always be saturated in this way The following
lemma which formulates this result is called the bounded saturation lemma
Lemma  Suppose S is a sequential derivation system containing the structural rules start
lmon rmon and cut If !  L
S
is an Ssaturator of   L
S
 then ! contains an
Ssaturated set 

such that   


Proof Let  E
S
! and let f 
i
g
iIN
be an enumeration of ! We dene the following
sequence of subsets of L
S


 

n 



n
 f 
n
g if 
n
 f 
n
g E
S
!

n
otherwise
Furthermore we take 

 L
S
to be the limit of this sequence




nIN

n

  

 ! is immediately clear from the denition of 

above Another direct consequence
of the construction above is 
n
E
S
! for all n  IN  What is left to show is 

 Sat
S

Suppose 


S
 We need to prove 

    The assumption set can be reduced to
a nite sequence 
 
     
m
in 

such that 
 
     
m

S
 see Observation  Because
every member of 

is a member of some 
i
 this means that there exists 
k
such that
f
 
     
m
g  
k

 
This implies 
k

S
 by lmon Since 
k
E
S
! we also have
!   Because   L
S
has been picked arbitrarily as an Sconclusion set of 

we have


E
S
! This conclusion combined with Lemma  guarantees the existence of a formula
   such that


 fg E
S
!
 

n
 
n 
for all n  IN  Let 
i
 
n
i
for all i      m and take k  max
i m
n
i
 This ensure 
i
 
k
for all i      m
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This result also ensures that 
n
 fg E
S
! for all n  IN 
 
Obviously   ! which means
that there exists l  IN such that  
l
  Because 
l
 f 
l
g E
S
! we know that   
l 
by
the inductive denition of the sequence f
n
g
nIN
 We conclude   

 and so 

  
This establishes the desired result 

 Sat
S
 
Observation  In fact this lemma is equivalent given the Pstructural rules with the so
called saturation lemma or generalized Lindenbaumlemma This result says that if  
S

then there exists a "  Sat
S
such that   " and   "  
 
Note that whenever S
contains the rule lmon then  E
S
! 	  
S
L
S
n ! So if S contains the structural
rules of P and ud then the bounded saturation lemma is the same as the saturation lemma
by means of this equivalence
 
The equivalence of the normal saturation lemma with the bounded version may give the
impression that Lemma  is superuous here Technically speaking it is but its upper bound
formulation has made completeness proofs for partial modal logics far more transparent
 	
As said earlier due to the bounded formulation many completeness proofs of partial modal
systems come down to the establishment of one or more saturation equations
Moreover the proof of Lemma  is a generalization of the standard proof of Lindenbaum	s
lemma which says that every consistent set has a maximally consistent extension This result
would immediately follow when !  L
S
is chosen in the proof of Lemma  Many proofs of
the ordinary saturation lemma have a somewhat deviant nature eg 
Troelstra  van Dalen


 The completeness of partial logics
The completeness proofs of P and its extensions is fairly easy Take Sat
P
 and associate to
every "  Sat
P
a partial valuation function V

which is dened by its content
V

p 

 i p  "
 i p  "
This denition together with the individual derivation rules ensure that V

j   i    "
for all "  Sat
P
and    L  This can be proved by a straightforward induction and
can be extended for the extended systems in the same fashion If  
P
 then there exists
#  Sat
P
such that   # and #   According to  above this means that V

j  
and V

j  for all     and    and therefore  j
P

 
All subsets of Ssaturants are Ssaturants by the lmon rule Dually by rmon all supersets of S
saturators are at least Ssaturators of the same saturants Formally 

   

 E
S

 

E
S



 
Most often this result is formulated for singleton 
s Aczel  The sequential variant can be found
in Thijsse 
 
Elias Thijsse has pointed this out to me
 	
Completeness proofs for partial modal logic with incomplete static expressivity has turned out to be pretty
troublesome Thijsse  Also normal form techniques used long intransparent proofs Jaspars b


The proof of Lemma  and the formulation are linguistically independent Due to our sequential setting
and the general denition of saturation it can be used for many logics with poor expressivity and does not
rely on the presence of certain connectives like the disjunction
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 The completeness of ud
The canonical model for the system ud which we need to run the Henkin procedure is given
by the following denition
Definition  The udcanonical model is the triple M
ud
 hSat
ud

ud
 V
ud
i where for
all   Sat
ud
and p  IP 

ud
 	 p
ud
    ap
ud
   and
V
ud
p 

 i p  
 i p  
Recall that p
ud
  f    j   
ud


u
 g and ap
ud
  f    j   
ud


d
 g see
denition 
Observation  We leave it to the reader to show that M
ud
 N ie V
ud
is monotonic
over 
ud
and 
ud
is a preorder
We give the socalled truthlemma of ud rst This lemma almost establishes the desired
result
Lemma  M
ud
 j       and M
ud
 j       for all   Sat
ud
    L
ud

Proof By induction on the construction of L
ud
formulae We skip the basic step and the
proofs of the static connectives For the dynamic modal operators there are four cases which
are nearly immediately obtainable from the denition of 
ud
 These four easy	 cases are
i 
 
u
  	M
ud
 j 
 
u

ii M
ud
 j 
 
u
 	 
 
u
  
iii 
 
d
  	M
ud
 j 
 
d

iv M
ud
 j 
 
d
	 
 
d
  
We will demonstrate the rst and the last step The two others are left to the reader

 
u
   	 
 
u
 
ud


u

 
u
 Example  modality reductions


ud
  
 
u
   	   
 
u
 
ud
 Example  modi ponentes


ud
     	    	 induction hypothesis


ud
 M
ud
 j  	M
ud
 j  	 M
ud
 j 
 
u


 
d
   	 
 
d
 
ud


u

 
d
 Example  modality reductions


ud
  
 
d
   	   
ud

 
d
 Example  modi ponentes


ud
     	    	 induction hypothesis


ud
 M
ud
j  	M
ud
j  	 M
ud
 j 
 
d

The completing converse results of these four easy	 cases are consequences of the following
sequential statements in combination with the bounded saturation lemma Lemma  In
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these saturation equations f g and nf g are abbreviated by   and   respectively
Furthermore the nonudpersistent part L
ud
n p
ud
L
ud
and the nonudantipersistent part
L
ud
n ap
ud
L
ud
of L
ud
are abbreviated by np and nap respectively
v 
 
u
   	 p
ud
    E
ud
  nap  
vi 
 
u
   	 p
ud
     E
ud
  nap
vii 
 
d
   	 ap
ud
 E
ud
  np   
viii 
 
d
   	 ap
ud
   E
ud
  np  
These saturation relations may seem complicated statements The following simple deriva
tions explain why they lead to immediate success For the sake of brevity we only prove
that the claims v and viii give us the desired results v 	 M
ud
 j 
 
u
 and viii
	M
ud
 j 
 
d

v 	   Sat
ud
 p
ud
      nap         
	 
ud
  M
ud
 j    M
ud
 j 
	 M
ud
 j 
 
u

The rst step consists of the application of the bounded saturation lemma to v  
ud

follows from the consequence and the simple observation that ap
ud
  nap  ap
ud
  
and therefore ap
ud
   The last step is due to application of the induction hypothesis
viii 	   Sat
ud
 ap
ud
      np         
	 
ud
  M
ud
 j    M
ud
 j 
	 M
ud
 j 
 
d

The rst step is an application of the bounded saturation lemma again The result implies

ud
 because p
ud
np  p
ud
   and so p
ud
   Again the last step follows from
the induction hypothesis The proofs of vi 	M
ud
 j 
 
u
 and vii 	M
ud
 j 
 
d

are left to the reader
What is left to show is the validity of the claims v  viii We only prove the rst and the
last claim The other two can be reproduced through mere analogy
Suppose 
 
u
  
Let "  L
ud
such that p
ud
   
ud
" We need to prove that
a "    nap    
If " nap   then we are done So suppose " nap   which is the same
as "  ap
ud
L
ud
  In other words all nonelements of " are udantipersistent ie
ap
ud
"   "  This yields the following minimal derivation
 p
ud
   
ud
"   rmon
  
ud
"  
 
u
 Example  p
ud
    lmon
Because   Sat
ud
 the last udsequent above and the assumption 
 
u
   entail
"      and therefore also "    nap     a
Suppose 
 
d
  
Let "  L
ud
with ap
ud
   
ud
" We need to prove that

 Completeness and Decidability 	
b "    np     
If " np    then we immediately have our desired result So let "  p
ud
L
ud
 
This means that p
ud
"   "  The following derivation settles this complementary
case
 ap
ud
 
ud
"     rmon
 
 
d
 
ud
"   Example  ap
ud
   lmon  p
ud
"    "  
  
ud
"   
 
d
  
Because   Sat
ud
 we conclude "       which also establishes b
These derivations settle v and viii 
With this result we have almost completed the completeness proof for ud Suppose that
 
ud
 According to the saturation Lemma  there exists "  Sat
ud
such that   " and
"   According to the truth lemma above this yields M
ud
" j   and M
ud
" j  for
all     and    Because M
ud
 N this shows that  j
N

Completeness for the systems ud
 
 ud

and ud
 
can be proved in precisely the same
manner The induction steps for the additional connectives in the corresponding truth lemmas
are straightforward
 Decidability
Decidability for nite udsequents can be established by a nite variation of the equipment
of the previous sections
Definition  Let $  L
S
 An S$saturated set is a set   $ such that for all   $
 
S
 	     The collection of S$saturated sets is abbreviated by Sat

S
 ! is
called a S$saturator of   $ i    	 !     for all   $ This relation is
abbreviated by  E

S
!
Lemma  Let $!  L
S
 and   $ If  E

S
! then there exists 

 Sat

S
such that
  

 !
Proof This proof runs completely in the same fashion as Lemma  An appropriate
reformulation of Lemma  is needed Furthermore the sequence  
i
in the proof of lemma 
should be taken from !  $ note that  E

S
!	  E

S
!  $ 
In order to prove the decidabity of ud we construct a nite countermodel for a given nite
nonudsequent % 
ud
& Let " be the set of subformulae of %  & and their negations
Clearly " is a nite set Consider the model M

ud
 hSat

ud


ud
 V

ud
i with 

ud
and V

ud
dened in the same way as 
ud
and V
ud
but then restricted to Sat

ud
 This construction
yields a restricted version of the truth lemma for ud with respect to M

ud

M j   	      M j   	    
for all % and &subformulae   and   Sat

ud
 This result can be proved just like Lemma 
Because M

ud
is nite and of xed size this immediately establishes the desired decidability
results
 Conclusions and reections  

Theorem  ud is decidable for nite sequents
This technique also applies to the systems ud
 
 ud

and ud
 
 No further ltration
techniques have to be used there
The given ltration technique yields exponential time upper bounds for deciding ud
validity
 
However by making use of established complexity results and known embed
ding results a much more rened result can be given 
Statman  shows that validity
for intuitionistic propositional logic is PSPACEcomplete This result immediately settles
PSPACEhardness for udvalidity because intuitionistic propositional logic is a fragment of
ud Furthermore by the polynomial time translation of ud into temporal S given in 
Jas
pars  and the PSPACEcompleteness result for this logic of 
Spaan  we obtain
PSPACEcompleteness for ud
 Conclusions and reflections
Information models have been employed as Kripke structures to dene dynamic modal logics
for reasoning about extension and reduction of partial states The bounded version of the
saturation lemmahas been particularly helpful in establishing a completeness and decidability
result for the underlying calculus ud
Of course our main technical concern has been to guide the congregation of partial and
dynamic modal logic With respect to the dynamic modal logics of Van Benthem and De
Rijke the relational part of our formalism is restricted The inevitable consequence of this
poverty is that minimal extensions and reductions do not appear in our formalism Such
minimal dynamic denotations can semantically be specied in the following manner


 
M
Ndy
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 
M
Ndy
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 
M
N
 u   t 	 t   ug


 
M 
Ndy
 fhs ti  

 
M 
Ndy
j u   s  u  

 
M
N
 t   u 	 u   tg
A future research challenge is to develop adequate sequential calculi for an extension of the
up and down calculus of this paper with additional modal operators over the relations above
Keeping the undecidability of Van Benthem and De Rijke	s formalism in mind one should
be aware of the possible technical dangers of such an enterprise
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